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Aiming at the Wrong Target: The "Audience
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SARAH H. LUDINGTON*
In Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002), the Fourth
Circuit crafted a jurisdictional test for Internet defamation that requires the
plaintiff to show that the defendant specifically targeted an audience in the
forum state for the state to exercise jurisdiction. This test relies on the
presumption that the Internet-which is accessible everywhere-is targeted
nowhere; it strongly protects foreign libel defendants who have published on
the Internet from being sued outside of their home states. Other courts,
including the North Carolina Court of Appeals, have since adopted or applied
the test. The jurisdictional safe harbor (ironically) provided by the very
ubiquity of the Internet is no doubt welcomed by media defendants and
frequent Internet publishers (e.g., bloggers) whose use of the Internet exposes
them to potentially nationwide jurisdiction for defamation. But it may go too
far in protecting libel defendants from facing the consequences of their false
and injurious statements. For every libel defendant insulated from jurisdiction
in a remote location, there is also a libel plaintiff who has potentially been
denied an effective remedy in a convenient location. This Article argues that
the jurisdictional test created in Young is flawed and particularly should not
be applied to libel defendants. It concludes with a simple suggestion: that the
appropriate test for personal jurisdiction over libel defendants in cases of
Internet defamation is the standard minimum contacts analysis.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is an incredibly powerful medium for publishing
information-including libel. With a few keystrokes, I can publish an injurious
falsehood accessible to anyone in the world with an Internet connection and the
desire to read it. Even better, my use of the Internet helps to insulate me from
having to defend against a defamation lawsuit in a foreign jurisdiction (even
though I know that my libel will be accessible there).' By broadcasting my libel
to the world at large through the Internet, the victim of my libel will have a
more difficult time convincing a court that I intended to target him in his home
state. Genius!
This Article discusses and critiques the jurisdictional safe harbor for
defamation defendants who publish on the Internet. In a 2002 case, Young v.
New Haven Advocate,2 the Fourth Circuit crafted a jurisdictional test for
Internet defamation that requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant
specifically targeted an audience in the forum state for that state to exercise
jurisdiction. 3 This test relies on the presumption that the Intemet-which is
accessible everywhere-is targeted nowhere; it strongly protects foreign libel
defendants who have published on the Internet from being sued outside of their
home states.4 Other courts, including the North Carolina Court of Appeals, have
I This Article uses the term "foreign" to refer to defendants and courts located in states
other than the plaintiff's home state. In this context, the term does not refer to defendants
and courts located in countries other than the United States.
2 Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002).
31d. at 258-59.
4At least seven libel defendants have successfully avoided defending themselves in
foreign jurisdictions in the Fourth Circuit due in part to the safe harbor provided by Young.
See, e.g., Jackson v. Michalski, No. 3:10-cv-00052, 2011 WL 3679143, at *5-6 (W.D. Va.
Aug. 22, 2011); Knight v. Doe, No. 1:10-cv-887, 2011 WL 2471543, at *2-4 (E.D. Va. June
21, 2011); Dutcher v. Eastbum, No. 5:10-CV-210-FL, 2011 WL 1134666, at *4 (E.D.N.C.
Mar. 26, 2011); Galustian v. Peter, 750 F. Supp. 2d 670, 675 (E.D. Va. 2010); Diagnostic
Devices, Inc. v. Pharma Supply, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-149-RJC-DSC, 2009 WL 3633888, at *9-
10 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 30, 2009); Williams v. Adver. Sex LLC, No. 1:05CV51, 2009 WL
723168, at *8-9 (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 17, 2009), rev'd on other grounds, 410 F. App'x 578
(4th Cir. 2011); Burleson v. Toback, 391 F. Supp. 2d 401, 415-16 (M.D.N.C. 2005); see
also Dring v. Sullivan, 423 F. Supp. 2d 540, 548-49 (D. Md. 2006) (finding no basis for
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since adopted or applied the test.
5
The jurisdictional safe harbor (ironically) provided by the very ubiquity of
the Internet is no doubt welcomed by media defendants and frequent Internet
publishers (e.g., bloggers) whose use of the Internet exposes them to potentially
nationwide jurisdiction for defamation. But does it go too far in protecting libel
defendants from facing the consequences of their false and injurious
statements? For every libel defendant insulated from jurisdiction in a remote
location, there is also a libel plaintiff who has potentially been denied an
effective remedy in a convenient location. And it will be small comfort to the
plaintiff that the defendant did not "target" her libel at an audience in the
plaintiff's home state; the libel was still accessible there and to the rest of the
world.
This Article argues that the Fourth Circuit's test is flawed and in particular
should not apply to libel cases.6 Part II discusses the background of Young,
including a discussion of the seminal libel jurisdiction case, Calder v. Jones.7
The Young test shifts the focus of the Calder "effects" test from the effect of the
libel on the plaintiff in his home state to whether the defendant intended to
target readers in the plaintiffs home state; this section argues that to reduce the
jurisdictional inquiry to essentially one factor is not only inconsistent with
Calder but also with the whole of modem jurisdictional analysis (of which
Calder is a part).
Part III critiques the reasoning in Young, which relies on a misguided
presumption and concerns about the Internet, and argues that the prevailing
''minimum contacts" analysis is more than adequate to protect against the
perceived dangers of the Internet (specifically, the fears that the ubiquity of the
Internet will create jurisdictional overexposure for libel defendants and
eviscerate notions of state sovereignty). This section also addresses concerns
that minimum contacts analysis does not adequately protect the First
Amendment freedoms of libel defendants, particularly individuals who publish
on the Internet.
Finally, this Article concludes with a simple suggestion: that the appropriate
test for personal jurisdiction over libel defendants in cases of Internet
defamation is the standard minimum contacts analysis. The Fourth Circuit (and
the courts that have followed it) should reconsider Young and instead use
audience targeting as one factor among many in its jurisdictional analysis.
long-arm jurisdiction over defendant and opining that minimum contacts were doubtful
based on targeting analysis).
5 Dailey v. Popma, 662 S.E.2d 12, 18 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); see also infra text
accompanying notes 156-57.
6This Article does not dispute that some form of the targeting test could be a useful
tool for jurisdictional analysis in some cases. See generally Michael A. Geist, Is There a
There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1345, 1380-1404 (2001) (advocating for the targeting test in cases involving Internet
commerce).
7 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Additionally, state legislatures should consider crafting a statutory approach to
personal jurisdiction in cases involving Internet defamation and address the
concern that substantive libel law may not adequately protect the speech rights
of some Internet publishers.
1I. BACKGROUND: How YOuNG RESTRICTS CALDER
Much of the confusion (and innovation) in cases involving Internet libel can
be traced to the lack of clarity in a key pre-Internet case, Calder v. Jones.
Calder is viewed by some lower courts as creating a three-part "effects" test for
personal jurisdiction in cases involving intentional torts:
(1) the defendant committed an intentional tort; (2) the plaintiff felt the brunt
of the harm in the forum, such that the forum can be said to be the focal point
of the harm; and (3) the defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the
forum, such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the tortious
activity. 8
In Young, the Fourth Circuit adapted the three-part effects test to the
Internet context by focusing on a single inquiry: "[W]hether the [defendants]
manifested an intent to direct their website content-which included certain
articles discussing conditions in a Virginia prison-to a Virginia audience."9
The Young test essentially eliminates the other concerns of the effects test-
most notably factor two, the effect of the defamation on the plaintiff-and
examines solely whether the defendant targeted its message to an audience in
the plaintiffs home state. The shift in inquiry from effects on the plaintiff to the
target audience of the libel can be explained in part by the confusion
surrounding Calder and in part by the Fourth Circuit's concern that the Internet
has the potential to create limitless jurisdiction over libel defendants.
8 Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 398 n.7 (4th
Cir. 2003); see IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265-66 (3d Cir. 1998); Griffis
v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 534 (Minn. 2002). Other courts have phrased the test slightly
differently. See, e.g., Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 2010) (requiring "(1)
intentional conduct (or 'intentional and allegedly tortious' conduct); (2) expressly aimed at
the forum state; (3) with the defendant's knowledge that the effects would be felt-that is
the plaintiff would be injured-in the forum state" (quoting Calder, 465 U.S. at 789));
Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000)
(requiring the defendant to have "(1) committed an intentional act, which was (2) expressly
aimed at the forum state, and (3) caused harm, the brunt of which is suffered and which the
defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state"); Capital Promotions, L.L.C. v.
Don King Prods., Inc., 756 N.W.2d 828, 837 (Iowa 2008) (requiring that "(1) the
defendant's acts were intentional; (2) these actions were uniquely or expressly aimed at the
forum state; and (3) the brunt of the harm was suffered in the forum state, and the defendant
knew the harm was likely to be suffered there").
9 Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2002) (emphasis
added).
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This section discusses Calder, arguing that the effects test should not be
reduced to a three-factor analysis but rather viewed as wholly consistent with
the principles of modem personal jurisdiction. It also argues that Young was
misguided in shrinking the jurisdictional analysis in libel cases to a focus on the
target audience of the libel rather than the totality of the defendant's contacts
with the forum state.
A. Understanding Calder
The purpose of this Article is not to attempt a complete decoding of Calder
v. Jones, which has mystified courts and commentators alike since 1984.10 But,
it is worth revisiting the opinion to establish one key point: Calder should be
viewed as a case in harmony with modem minimum contacts analysis, rather
than a three-part (much less one-part) test for intentional torts.
In Calder v. Jones, TV star Shirley Jones and her husband, Marty Ingels,
sued the National Enquirer, its local distributor, John South (the reporter who
wrote the offending article), and lain Calder (the president and editor of the
Enquirer), in California state court.11 South and Calder were Florida residents
who had few contacts with California. 12 South had telephoned the state while
writing the article and had traveled there several times for business; Calder had
10See, e.g., Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 704-08 (noting circuit splits and variations in stating
and applying the effects test); United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 624 n.7
(1st Cir. 2001) (noting disagreements among several circuits in interpreting Calder);
Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 394-95 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (describing three
different judicial views of the "express aiming" requirement of Calder); Patrick J. Borchers,
Internet Libel: The Consequences of a Non-Rule Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 98 Nw.
U. L. REV. 473, 488-89 (2004) (describing the difficulty courts have had applying Calder in
Internet libel cases); C. Douglas Floyd & Shima Baradaran-Robison, Toward a Unified Test
of Personal Jurisdiction in an Era of Widely Diffused Wrongs: The Relevance of Purpose
and Effects, 81 IND. L.J. 601, 618-21 (2006) (discussing the confusion surrounding the
meaning of the "express aiming" or "intentional targeting requirement" of the Calder test);
Andrew F. Halaby, You Won't Be Back: Making Sense of "Express Aiming" After
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 625, 625 (2005) (arguing for
the need to clarify the "express aiming" element of the Calder "effects test" for specific
personal jurisdiction); Denis T. Rice & Julia Gladstone, An Assessment of the Effects Test in
Determining Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 58 Bus. LAW. 601, 603, 652-53 (2003)
(concluding that "diverse pre-Intemet interpretations of the effects test" have resulted in
inconsistent application of the test in Internet cases); Teresa J. Cassidy, Case Note, Effects of
the "Effects Test": Problems of Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet; Dudnikov v. Chalk
& Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2008), 9 Wyo. L. REV. 575, 590-94
(2009) (discussing the difficulties of anticipating the outcomes of the "effects test" in the
Tenth Circuit due to inherent ambiguities in the test and inconsistent application by the
courts); Scott T. Jansen, Comment, Oh, What a Tangled Web... the Continuing Evolution
of Personal Jurisdiction Derived from Internet-Based Contacts, 71 Mo. L. REV. 177, 183-85
(2006) (characterizing the application of the Calder "effects" test and the Zippo test in the
federal circuit courts as "neither. . . entirely inconsistent nor exactly uniform").
" Calder, 465 U.S. at 784-86.
121d. at 785-86.
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visited California twice for unrelated reasons. 13 The Enquirer and its distributor
appeared in the case, but South and Calder challenged personal jurisdiction.'
4
The Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction over South and Calder based on the
"effects" of the defendants' conduct in Florida on the plaintiffs in California:
"The article was drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in
terms both of respondent's emotional distress and the injury to her professional
reputation, was suffered in California. In sum, California is the focal point both
of the story and of the harm suffered."'15 The Court went on to note that the
defendants had not been charged with "mere untargeted negligence."' 16 Instead,
they had written and edited an article "that they knew would have a potentially
devastating impact" on Jones, and that the injury would be felt in the state
where "she lives and works" (Hollywood being located in California) "and in
which the National Enquirer has its largest circulation."' 17 Under these
circumstances, Calder and South could "reasonably anticipate being haled into
court" in California.
18
The Court did not elaborate on the framework of its analysis (much less
announce the three-part test that later decisions have distilled from Calder), but
clues to the Court's method can be inferred from the sources it cited. Most
significantly, the Court relied on its landmark twentieth-century personal
jurisdiction cases, including International Shoe Co. v. Washington,19 Shaffer v.
Heitner,20 and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.21 Those cases held
that a state may exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only if the
defendant has "minimum contacts" with the forum state. 22 The contacts serve
two functions: to preserve limits on state sovereignty and to ensure that the
state's exercise of jurisdiction is fair to the defendant. 23 The Court in World-
Wide Volkswagen engaged in an extensive discussion of foreseeability, which
functions as a sort of proxy for fairness in modem jurisdictional analysis. The
Court emphasized that the "mere likelihood that a product will find its way into
the forum State" is not an adequate gauge of whether the defendant could have
anticipated a lawsuit in that state.24 Rather, "the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum State" must be such that "he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there."25 Foreseeability thus gives a "degree of
131d.
14 Id
'51d at 788-89.
161d. at 789.
17 Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90.
18 1d at 790.
19 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
20 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
21 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
22Id. at 291; Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 203; Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
23 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 291-92.
24 1d at 297.
25 Id.
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predictability" to the operation of the legal system, allowing potential
defendants "to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance
as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit."
26
The citations in Calder to International Shoe, Shaffer, and World- Wide
Volkswagen suggest, at a minimum, that Calder was intended to be consistent
with these cases, rather than breaking entirely new ground. This conclusion is
supported by the Court's emphasis on foreseeability and purposeful behavior
(the hallmarks of modem jurisdictional analysis) in its ultimate conclusion that
the defendants could reasonably foresee being haled into court in California,
given their purposeful behavior regarding Jones, whom they knew to live and
work in California.27 Further, the Court cited Section 37 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, 28 which essentially restates the High Court's
minimum contacts analysis, suggesting that a sensitive analysis of the totality of
the libel defendant's contacts with the forum state, including their quality and
nature, the defendant's intent, and the foreseeability of causing harm in a
particular jurisdiction, is crucial to determining whether jurisdiction is
appropriate.
Additional support for the theory that Calder is consistent with minimum
contacts analysis comes from the cases cited in Jones's successful brief to the
Supreme Court, advocating for the "effects doctrine." 29 First, Jones's brief
argues that the "effects doctrine" is entirely consistent with the due process
principles in International Shoe and World-Wide Volkswagen, among other
cases. 30 Second, the brief argues in favor of the multi-factor approach to
analyzing jurisdiction over foreign libel defendants adopted previously by lower
courts. 31 For example, in Church of Scientology of California v. Adams (a case
cited in the Jones brief), the Ninth Circuit employed the effects doctrine to deny
personal jurisdiction in California over the Pulitzer Publishing Company. 32 The
St. Louis Post-Dispatch had published a series of articles critical of the Missouri
Church of Scientology and Scientology in general; the articles had not
mentioned the California Church, yet 156 copies of the offending articles had
been circulated in California.33 The court rejected the argument that the
"likelihood that an offending publication will enter a forum" is by itself a fair
26Id.
27 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-90 (1984) (noting that jurisdiction is
appropriate when a corporation makes a deliberate effort to serve a particular market); see
also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (noting that the "fair
warning" required by the Due Process Clause "is satisfied if the defendant has 'purposefully
directed' his activities at residents of the forum" (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984))).
28 Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
29 Brief for Appellee, Calder, 465 U.S. 783 (No. 82-1401), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 219, at *48-64.
301d. at *50-60.
31 Id. at *60-63.
32 Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 1978).
33 1d. at 895-96.
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measure of the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction over a publisher.34
Instead, it examined multiple factors bearing on the foreseeability of the effect
(the risk of causing injury by defamation in the forum state).35 These factors
included the subject matter of the article, whether it specifically mentioned
California residents or corporations, whether the reporters conducted research in
California, and whether California readers were the primary intended audience
of the article. 36 Given that none of these factors were present, the Ninth Circuit
found that the jurisdiction would be unreasonable.
37
But Calder is such a cryptic opinion that the aspects of the opinion that
incorporate minimum contacts analysis do not fully prove that Calder follows a
modern jurisdictional framework. For example, despite relying on World- Wide
Volkswagen, the Court did not engage in a systematic inquiry into the
constitutional reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over Calder and South-
the second part of the jurisdictional framework established by that case.38 It can
be presumed from the outcome in Calder that the Court considered California's
exercise of jurisdiction not to violate the Due Process Clause, but the absence of
the reasonableness inquiry raises the question whether the Court considered it
unnecessary in that context, reinforcing the perception that the Calder effects
test stands apart from modern jurisdictional analysis.
39
In addition, the broad citation in Calder to Section 37 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws could be seen as endorsing a "bright line" test for
personal jurisdiction in cases of intentional torts.40 Section 37 describes the
personal jurisdiction analysis in several typical situations involving foreign
defendants and intentional injuries, including: "(1) the act was done with the
intention of causing the particular effects in the state" and "(2) the act, although
341d. at 897.
35 1d. at 897-98.
36 1d. at 898.
37 1d. at 898-99.
38This inquiry would have involved considering the factors outlined in World-Wide
Volkswagen, including the burden on the defendants of litigating in a distant forum, the
interest of the forum state in adjudicating the suit, the interest of the plaintiffs in obtaining
convenient and effective relief, the interest of the interstate judicial system in efficient
resolution of controversies, and the interest of the states in furthering substantive social
policies. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
39 1n Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), decided the same day as
Calder, the Court similarly cited to World-Wide Volkswagen but did not engage in its own
independent balancing analysis after finding that the defendant had minimum contacts with
the forum state. Id. at 774-75. Instead, the Court rejected the conclusion of the court of
appeals that it would be unfair to subject Hustler to jurisdiction in New Hampshire. Id. at
775 ("We think that the three concerns advanced by the Court of Appeals, whether
considered singly or together, are not sufficiently weighty to merit a different result. The
'single publication rule,' New Hampshire's unusually long statute of limitations, and
plaintiff's lack of contacts with the forum State do not defeat jurisdiction otherwise proper
under both New Hampshire law and the Due Process Clause.").
40 See Rice & Gladstone, supra note 10, at 608-13 (describing the evolution of the
"Strict Effects Test" and the "Soft Effects Test" in the federal courts of appeal).
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not done with the intention of causing effects in the state, could reasonably have
been expected to do so."41 The first situation is exemplified by the defendant
"who intentionally hits the plaintiff in state X with a bullet shot from state "';
clearly, that defendant will be subject to the jurisdiction of state X regarding
claims arising from the injury.42 If type 1 scenarios include defamation, as some
courts and commentators believe, 43 the jurisdictional analysis would indeed rely
on few factors and might reasonably be reduced to a three-part test that differs
from the searching inquiry into contacts mandated by International Shoe and
World- Wide Volkswagen.
But in scenarios involving the Restatement's second example, there will be
no personal jurisdiction over the defendant unless circumstances indicate that
the effect in the foreign state was "somewhat more than merely foreseeable," as
when noxious fumes from a factory in state X drift to state Y, causing injury
there, or where the defendant has contacts in addition to the foreseeable effects
that support jurisdiction.44 Type 2 scenarios result in a jurisdictional analysis
that looks at the totality of the defendant's contacts with the forum state-i.e.,
minimum contacts analysis. If type 2 scenarios include defamation, the
jurisdictional analysis will require a more searching analysis of the defendant's
contacts with the forum state and essentially consists of minimum contacts
analysis. Consistent with the type 2 approach, some courts interpret Calder as a
particular application of the High Court's minimum contacts analysis to the
specific circumstances of libel and other intentional torts and not a
fundamentally different approach to the jurisdictional analysis.45 Regrettably,
4 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 cmt. e (1971).
421d. (italics added).
43 Buckley v. N.Y. Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 1967) (noting that "the
publisher [of a libel] directly inflicts damage on the intangible reputation just as the
frequently hypothesized but rarely encountered gunman firing across a state line does on the
body"); A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to Traditional
Principles to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 102.
44 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 cmt. e.
45 See Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 473 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the effects test "is
but one facet of the ordinary minimum contacts analysis, to be considered as part of the full
range of the defendant's contacts with the forum"); IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155
F.3d 254, 265 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that Calder did not "carve out a special intentional torts
exception to the traditional specific jurisdiction analysis"); Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d
85, 90 (1st Cir. 1998) (applying Calder as a means of applying the purposeful availment
requirement in World-Wide Volkswagen); Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 286
(5th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he effects test is not a substitute for a nonresident's minimum contacts
that demonstrate purposeful availment of the benefits of the forum state."); Dakota Indus.,
Inc., v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1390-91 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that "[i]n
relying on Calder, we do not abandon [our minimum contacts test] ... [w]e simply note that
Calder requires the consideration of additional factors when an intentional tort is alleged");
Wallace v. Herron, 778 F.2d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he key to Calder is that the
effects of an alleged intentional tort are to be assessed as part of the analysis of the
defendant's relevant contacts with the forum."); ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON,
LmEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 733 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that "[u]nder standard
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the Court in Calder did not indicate which of the intentional tort scenarios it
perceived as most relevant to a defamation case.
But despite the confusion, the Calder analysis stands on firmer
constitutional footing if it is grounded within the established parameters of
minimum contacts analysis. 46 The Supreme Court has never indicated that
jurisdictional analysis should fundamentally differ depending on the type of
injury alleged or the cause of action in the complaint. Nor has it given any
indication (except by omission) that its jurisdictional analysis for intentional
torts should stand apart from the analysis for negligent torts, tax evasion, breach
of contract, or any other cause of action. Nor in Calder did the Court announce
a three-part test; in the years since Calder was decided, the Court has
consistently "rejected the notion that personal jurisdiction might turn on
'mechanical' tests" or "talismanic jurisdictional formulas." 47
Thus, despite being reduced to a three-part test by many lower courts, it is
unlikely that the effects test was intended to be so simple. Instead, the effects
test can be seen as entirely consistent with the High Court's modern approach to
personal jurisdiction, requiring a sensitive and comprehensive analysis of the
totality of the defendant's contacts with the forum state, including the nature of
the behavior alleged (volitional or not), the likelihood that its harm would be
experienced in the forum state, the intervention of random, fortuitous, or
unilateral third-party behavior, and whether the effects in the forum state were
foreseeable. 48 As is evident from Calder, the factors most relevant to the
analysis in a libel case will be the plaintiff's residence and work place, the
defendant's knowledge of those places and research or other contacts with the
forum prior to publishing the libel, the subject matter of the libel, and the
method and manner of publication.
Because the Calder effects test is as messy and multi-factored as the rest of
the High Court's personal jurisdiction doctrine, efforts to reduce it to a one-
factor test are inherently misguided. As an example of misguided one-
due process doctrine, that conduct therefore gave rise to jurisdiction over the defendants in
the forum state").
46 Professor Robertson argues that Calder should be clarified and drastically limited by
forcing plaintiffs to prove their allegations by a preponderance of the evidence before
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Practically speaking, this means that a libel
plaintiff will rarely be able to sue a foreign defendant in her home state, especially if she
sues a media defendant (in which case she would be forced to establish the defendant's
actual malice before having access to discovery). See Cassandra Burke Robertson, The
Inextricable Merits Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 45 U.C. DAvis L. REV. (forthcoming
2012) (manuscript at 52), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1952892 ("The court can no longer assume for jurisdictional purposes that the plaintiff's
allegations of wrongfulness and harm are true; instead, those allegations must be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence.... [L]eft with two difficult options... [the court can] wait[]
until trial to resolve the issue of personal jurisdiction[] or narrow[] the effects test to require
plaintiffs to sue elsewhere.").
47 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478, 485 (1985).48 See generally id. at 472-74 (summarizing the parameters of contacts analysis).
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dimensional thinking, some lower courts interpreting Calder have emphasized
its mention that the National Enquirer had its largest circulation in California,
presumably construing that circulation as evidence of express aiming at the
forum state (one of the "elements" in the three-part version of Calder). In
Calder, however, the Court expressly declined to impute control over the
circulation of the magazine to its reporter and president-"[p]etitioners are
correct that their [activities] are not to be judged according to their employer's
activities [in California]"-and thus the Court did not consider evidence of the
magazine's circulation in California as an independent source of contact
between the individual defendants and the forum. 49 Because the magazine's
significant circulation in California was not counted against the individual
defendants (the only litigants in the Supreme Court), that circulation could
hardly have been the sole or determinative basis for the Court's decision. 50 The
Fourth Circuit, however, has seized upon the intended audience of the libel-an
updated way of describing the circulation of a publication-as the factor of
greatest significance in determining whether jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant is appropriate.
B. Young Shifts the Test from "Effects" to "Audience Targeting"
The Fourth Circuit in Young v. New Haven Advocate used an "audience
targeting" test to impose a strict limit on jurisdiction over foreign defendants in
libel cases. 51 Stanley Young, a Virginia prison warden, sued two newspapers,
the New Haven Advocate and the Hartford Courant, and several of their editors
and reporters, in federal court in Virginia. 52 The defendants had published
articles and blogs on their Web sites sharply critical of Wallens Ridge State
Prison in Big Stone Gap, Virginia, where Young was the warden and where
Connecticut was temporarily housing some of its prisoners. 53 All defendants
challenged personal jurisdiction.
54
49 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984).
50 The circulation of the Enquirer, of which South, as president of the Enquirer, was
certainly aware, was relevant to the Court's determination that the president of the Enquirer
could have foreseen injury to Jones and Ingalls in California. Id. at 789-90.
51 Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2002).
52Id. at 259.
53 One of the offending articles was titled "Welcome to the Confederacy." Complaint
6, Young v. New Haven Advocate, 184 F. Supp. 2d 498 (W.D. Va. 2001) (No.
2:00CV00086), 2000 WL 35633784, 6. Regarding Young, the article describes "Civil War
paraphernalia in the warden's office, including a ball and chain and a painting of a battle
scene with the Confederate flag, a symbol of Southerners who wanted to uphold the
institution of slavery." Camille Jackson, Welcome to the Confederacy: Virginia Horror
Stories Build Pressure to Keep Inmates Here, NEW HAVEN ADVOC. (Mar. 30, 2000),
http://web.archive.org/web/20000526063448/hup://newmassmedia.com/nac.phtml?code=ne
w&db=nacfea&ref- 10075 (accessed by searching for New Haven Advocate in the Internet
Archive index). The article also reports on harsh conditions in the prison: inmates "tell
stories of being tied to a bed, spread-eagled naked for 72 hours, lying in their own feces. Of
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Young argued for jurisdiction based on the long reach of Internet
publications: the defendants-knowing that Young was a Virginia resident and
an employee of the state correctional system and knowing that the harm of any
defamatory content would be suffered by Young in Virginia-posted
defamatory articles on their Web sites, which were accessible to readers in
Virginia.55 Under a mechanical application of the three-part version of the
Calder effects test, Virginia would have jurisdiction over the defendants
because they had intentionally directed wrongdoing at a Virginia resident,
knowing that the brunt of the injury would be felt in Virginia where Young
lived and worked (indeed, this is how the district court analyzed the case). 56
Additional factors counseled in favor of jurisdiction: the defendants could have
foreseen, based on the substance of the article, that it might cause injury to
Young in Virginia; Young was mentioned by name, as was the prison where he
was a warden, as was the location of the prison. 57 The reporter had made
several calls to the state in the course of researching the article. 58 Under Calder,
this is likely sufficient volitional contact with the forum state to find jurisdiction
over the media defendants. 59
But the Fourth Circuit did not apply Calder to the case. Instead, it crafted a
new test that inquires whether the defendants "inten[ded] to direct their website
content-which included several articles discussing conditions in a Virginia
prison-to a Virginia audience."60 The Young test thereby shifted the focus of
the jurisdictional inquiry from the plaintiff, whose injury is the linchpin of the
analysis in Calder, to the intended audience of the defendant'.s publication.
Essentially, it replaced the nuanced, fact-intensive inquiry of Calder--or, if you
prefer, the simplified three-part effects test-into a single inquiry: whether the
Web site at issue is directed at an audience or readers within the forum state. If
this audience targeting is absent, according to Young, the state cannot exercise
jurisdiction over the defendant.
61
The test in Young is based on the Fourth Circuit's already narrow test for
jurisdiction involving Internet-mediated contacts, which requires evidence that
the defendant has "directed" its electronic activity into the state. In a 2002 case,
ALS Scan v. Digital Service Consultants, the Fourth Circuit "adopt[ed] and
adapt[ed] the Zippo model" of Web site Internet jurisdiction (which is based on
the interactivity of the defendant's Web site), ruling that:
guards taunting them to fight.... The phones are monitored, violating attomey/client
privileges. And then there are the racial slurs." Id.
54 Young, 315 F.3d at 259-60.
55 1d. at 262.
56 1d. at 260; Young, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 508; Spencer, supra note 43, at 101.
57 Young, 315 F.3d at 259, 262.
58 Id. at 259.
59 As in Calder and Keeton, the jurisdictional analysis for the media defendant must be
conducted separately from the individual defendants.
60 Young, 315 F.3d at 263 (emphasis added).
61 Cf Spencer, supra note 43, at 83 (noting that the ALS Scan test is "cumulative").
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[A] State may, consistent with due process, exercise judicial power over a
person outside of the State when that person (1) directs electronic activity into
the State, (2) with the manifested intent of engaging in business or other
interactions within the State, and (3) that activity creates, in a person within the
State, a potential cause of action cognizable in the State's courts.6
2
Young adapts the wording of the ALS Scan test-directing electronic
activity into the state-to better fit the defamation context. Under both
approaches, however, the defendant's use of the Internet works to her advantage
because the plaintiff must be able to show that the defendant created the Web
site deliberately to reach persons or an audience within the forum state.
To justify this requirement of state-specific targeting, the court in ALS Scan
expressed concern that the Internet had the potential to subject its users to
limitless jurisdiction, or jurisdiction in every forum where the offending
material can be accessed: "[I]f [a] broad interpretation of [electronically-
mediated] minimum contacts were adopted, State jurisdiction over persons
would be universal, and notions of limited State sovereignty and personal
jurisdiction would be eviscerated. '63 The court's "directing" requirement was
thus intended to limit jurisdiction in ways that the court believed minimum
contacts analysis does not:
Under [the ALS Scan] standard, a person who simply places information on the
Internet does not subject himself to jurisdiction in each State into which the
electronic signal is transmitted and received. Such passive Internet activity
does not generally include directing electronic activity into the State with the
manifested intent of engaging business or other interactions in the State .... 64
The limit on jurisdiction in the Fourth Circuit test relies (in the words of one
commentator) on a "fictitious presumption that Internet activity is targeted
nowhere."65 This "presumption of aimlessness" 66 favors the defendant, as it
forces the plaintiff to find evidence other than accessibility of the Web site in
the forum state to show specific targeting.
Consistent with ALS Scan, the court in Young declined to find that the
defendants' Web sites provided the additional knowing, targeted contacts
sufficient to give Virginia personal jurisdiction over the defendants. 67 This
decision rested in part on the finding that the media defendants were "local"
62 ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714-15 (4th Cir.
2002) (holding that a Georgia-based Internet service provider (ISP), with a Web site
accessible in Maryland, was not subject to jurisdiction in Maryland based on copyright-
infringing photographs posted on a Web site that it hosted, because the ISP "did not select or
knowingly transmit infringing photographs specifically to Maryland").
63 1d. at 713.
641d. at 714.
65 Spencer, supra note 43, at 88.
66 1d.
67 Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 262-63 (4th Cir. 2002).
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Connecticut papers, based on the "general thrust and content" of their Web sites
(including their advertisements, weather and traffic information, links to state
government, and the subject matter of the other articles that appeared on the
site).68 The court also determined that the offending articles-which mentioned
a Virginia resident by name and reported on harsh conditions in the prison that
he ran in Virginia-were intended to "encourage[] a public debate in
Connecticut about whether the transfer policy was sound or practical for that
state and its citizens. 69
In essence, the court determined that the media defendants were "local"
Connecticut publications (despite being accessible nationally through the
Internet), so the offending articles were targeted solely at and of interest solely
to a Connecticut audience (despite mentioning persons, places, and events in
Virginia).70 The logic of this analysis means that local and regional publications
can take advantage of the nationwide scope of the Internet by publishing their
content on the Web, but the very ubiquity of the Internet-publishing medium
means that they do not target their publication at any particular audience (or
forum state) outside of their local readership. These two fictions-the
presumption of aimlessness and the paradoxical notion of a "local" Web site-
work together to create the jurisdictional safe harbor of Young.
C. Tough to Reconcile: Calder and Young
It is difficult to reconcile the test in Young with the test in Calder.71 In ALS
Scan, the Fourth Circuit described its requirement that a foreign defendant's
electronic activity must be "directed at" and cause injury in the forum state as
"not dissimilar" from the effects test in Calder.72 But the court in Young
deliberately narrowed from Calder the type of targeting that justifies personal
jurisdiction.73 Calder grounded its finding of specific jurisdiction on the effects
68 d. at 263.
69 Id. at 263-64 (emphasis added).
70 1d. at 263.
71 See Borchers, supra note 10, at 482-89 (arguing that the targeting approach in libel
cases cannot be reconciled with either Calder or Keeton).
72 ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002).
73 Young explicitly relied on a Fourth Circuit decision that had purportedly given a
narrowing construction to Calder. Young, 315 F.3d at 262 (citing ESAB Grp., Inc. v.
Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 625-26 (4th Cir. 1997)). Ironically, the court in Young misread
its earlier holding. In ESAB Group, a case involving misappropriation of trade secrets and
other intentional torts (but not libel), the Fourth Circuit initially found that the defendants
did not "manifest behavior intentionally targeted at and focused on" the forum state. ESAB
Grp., 126 F.3d at 625. Given this lack of targeted behavior (and failure to meet the
requirements of Calder), the court looked for evidence of additional contacts between the
defendants and the forum state and found it lacking. Id. Ultimately, it held that without
evidence of intentional targeting, jurisdiction could not be based purely on the location of
the plaintiffs injury absent other contacts with the forum state: "Although the place that the
plaintiff feels the alleged injury is plainly relevant to the inquiry, it must ultimately be
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of the libel on the targeted victim, the intentional nature of the defendant's
conduct, and the foreseeability of the effect of the conduct in the forum state.
74
Whatever the meaning of Calder, it plainly did not require jurisdiction to be
based on the target audience of the libel.
75
Shifting the focus of the jurisdictional inquiry from the libel victim to the
target audience is a significant move, given the fundamental nature of the harm
that defamation redresses, which, while complex and difficult to define, is
personal to the plaintiff and has little to do with the audience of the libel.76 The
tort of defamation is generally understood to protect a person's interest in her
reputation, 77 thereby safeguarding the dignity of the individual. 78 The tort does
not provide justice to the community in which the defamed person resides,
except to the extent that it reinforces civility rules, restores the defamed person
to rightful standing in the community, 79 and re-establishes the truth.80 The
black-letter law of defamation has no requirement of showing injury to anyone
accompanied by the defendant's own contacts with the state if jurisdiction over the
defendant is to be upheld." Id. at 626. This holding is completely consistent with Calder, not
a limitation on it. Other circuits have more deliberately limited Calder. See Spencer, supra
note 43, at 99-103 (discussing the ways that circuit courts have limited the effects test).
74Liability for Calder and South was based on their participation in "an alleged
wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California resident." Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,
790 (1984).
75The audience-targeting requirement is also at odds with the Supreme Court's
statement that the "'fair warning' requirement [of the Due Process Clause] is satisfied if the
defendant has 'purposefully directed' his activities at residents of the forum, and the
litigation results from alleged injuries that 'arise out of or relate to' those activities." Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (emphasis added) (quoting Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)).76 See Spencer, supra note 43, at 101-03 (asserting that, by focusing on these
"irrelevant others," the Fourth Circuit test simply denies jurisdiction where it would be
upheld under Calder).
77 See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (noting that a
jury can award damages for loss of reputation, shame, mortification, humiliation, loss of
standing in the community, and mental anguish and suffering); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS ch. 24 (1977) (subtitled "invasions of interest in reputation"); Robert C. Post, The
Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REv.
691, 693-711 (1986) (variously theorizing the reputational interest as a property, honor, or
dignity interest).
7 8 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 885 (2000).
79 See Post, supra note 77, at 712-13.
80 Cf Keeton, 465 U.S. at 776 ("False statements of fact harm both the subject of the
falsehood and the readers of the statement. New Hampshire may rightly employ its libel
laws to discourage the deception of its citizens. There is 'no constitutional value in false
statements of fact."' (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340)); see also Laura A. Heymann, The Law
of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341, 1417-22 (2011)
(arguing in favor of a greater focus on the audience's interest in receiving truthful
information in causes of action involving harm to reputation).
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other than the plaintiff; by contrast, the plaintiff must establish that the libel is
"of and concerning" the plaintiff (i.e., designates the plaintiff in such a way that
people who know the plaintiff understand that she has been identified in the
publication). 81 Nor is it necessary to target the plaintiffs local community to
prove that harm occurred in that location; rather, it is generally stated that the
injury takes place wherever the offending publication is circulated, even if the
plaintiff is not present in that location.82 Given the nature of the harm, the
Fourth Circuit's almost exclusive focus on audience marks a significant shift
away from the individual to the individual's community.
It is true that courts have traditionally included the circulation and intended
audience of a publication as a factor when determining personal jurisdiction in
libel cases. After Calder and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, it is generally
understood that the regular circulation within a state of a substantial number of
copies of a national publication (like the National Enquirer or Hustler) will
subject a media defendant to jurisdiction within the state. 83 When a publication
does not have a national circulation, courts have taken into account other factors
establishing contacts, such as the number of papers sold in the forum state and
its percentage of the paper's total circulation; sales and advertising solicitations
within the state and the amount of revenue they generate for the publisher; and
the presence of reporters, investigators, or correspondents within the forum
state. 84 A local paper with a very small circulation within the forum state may
nevertheless be haled into a foreign court if it publishes an article that would be
of particular interest to readers in that state. 85 Such a publication not only does
particular damage to the plaintiffs reputation (for example, a defamatory
publication about an elected official in that official's home state),8 6 but it also
injures the readers by exposing them to false statements of fact (about their
elected official).8 7 The Fourth Circuit's audience-targeting analysis would be
8 1 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558; see also SACK & BARON, supra
note 45, at 512 (noting evidence used to establish actual injury to reputation, including
physical trauma, plaintiffs need for medical attention, avoidance of social contact, and
change in personality or ability to concentrate); id. at 149-52 (describing the "of and
concerning" requirement).
82 Keeton, 465 U.S. at 777 (allowing jurisdiction in forum where defamatory magazines
circulated); Telco Commc'ns v. An Apple a Day, 977 F. Supp. 404, 408 (E.D. Va. 1997)
("[D]efamation, like libel, occurs wherever the offensive material is circulated or
distributed."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A cmt. A.
83 Keeton, 465 U.S. at 770, 774 (noting that the regular circulation of 10,000 copies of
Hustler in New Hampshire each month "cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
characterized as random, isolated, or fortuitous").
8 4 SACK & BARON, supra note 45, at 742-43.
85 See, e.g., Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d 316, 325 (10th Cir. 1977).
86 Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F. Supp. 737, 744 (D. Nev. 1985).
87 Cf Keeton, 465 U.S. at 776 ("False statements of fact harm both the subject of the
falsehood and the readers of the statement. New Hampshire may rightly employ its libel
laws to discourage the deception of its citizens. There is 'no constitutional value in false
statements of fact."' (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974))).
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consistent with this prior case law if it treated the defendants' target audience as
one factor-rather than the determinative factor-in the jurisdictional analysis.
Finally, to fully appreciate how the Young test varies from the analysis in
Calder, consider how differently the two cases came out, despite remarkably
similar facts. Neither Calder nor South had traveled to California in conjunction
with writing the article about Shirley Jones; like the individual defendants in
Young, they had made telephone calls to the state regarding the article but had
no other contacts related to the article. In both cases, the plaintiffs were
mentioned by name in the offending articles, as were the forum states and the
plaintiffs' occupations, and the individual defendants clearly knew where the
plaintiffs lived and worked. If the presumption of aimlessness had been applied
to the National Enquirer (i.e., presuming that the Enquirer was not targeted at
any particular audience in any particular state because it was directed at a
national audience and accessible in all fifty states), the case against South and
Calder would have been dismissed.
88
In the end, the only way to reconcile Calder and Young is to note that
Young involved publication on the Internet. The National Enquirer distributed
physical copies of its publication in California, whereas the New Haven
Advocate and Hartford Courant published electronic versions of their
newspapers in Virginia by making them accessible there on the Internet. Does
the different medium of publication justify such a different test?
III. THE INTERNET BOOGEYMAN: WHY YOuNG RESTRICTS CALDER
What could have motivated the Fourth Circuit to so transparently restrict
Calder? As previously noted, the Fourth Circuit's restrictive Internet
jurisdiction cases reflect the concern that using the Internet potentially subjects
a defendant to nationwide jurisdiction, thereby potentially subverting the
"traditional" due process principles governing state jurisdiction over foreign
88 See Borchers, supra note 10, at 483-84 (describing the inconsistencies between the
holdings in Young, Calder, and Keeton). While there is no indication that the Fourth Circuit
will extend the presumption of aimlessness to print publishers, the court's reasoning is broad
enough for media defendants to argue that it should. After all, the Enquirer is a national
publication, it publishes in all fifty states (and currently on the Internet), and therefore, under
the reasoning in Young, cannot be said to focus on or target an audience in any particular
state, even though its articles are accessible there. But see Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d
693, 707 n.10 (7th Cir. 2010) (approving tentatively of the reasoning in Young, with the
caveat that a truly nationwide paper like USA Today would likely be subject to jurisdiction
under the Keeton model for libel published on its Web site). If liberally applied, the
presumption of aimlessness has the potential to undo the ability of many public figures to
sue for libel in their home states. See Jackson v. Cal. Newspapers P'ship, 406 F. Supp. 2d
893, 896, 899 (N.D. I11. 2005) (reasoning that a plaintiff with a reputation that is "truly
national" in scope is less likely to feel the brunt of the harm in his place of residence and that
the state of Illinois has a diminished interest in protecting the reputations of its residents with
national reputations).
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defendants. 89 This concern can also be seen in cases applying Young or similar
analyses.90 The concerns are partly bound up with traditional notions of state
sovereignty and the territorial basis of jurisdiction, but also betray a fear that it
would be unfair to subject a defendant to national jurisdictional exposure simply
because the Internet is such a powerful medium; 91 the instinct, it seems, is to
preserve traditional notions of jurisdiction by protecting the defendant from
perceived overreaching by state courts based on the defendant's use of the
Internet.
The Fourth Circuit is not alone in its concerns about jurisdiction in cases
involving the Internet. It is a problem that has vexed the nation's courts for the
better part of two decades and a satisfactory rule has yet to emerge. The Internet
has spawned a series of jurisdictional innovations that are predicated on
misunderstandings and fear of the medium; ALS Scan and Young represent
stages in the evolution of a best practice that has included the "Zippo test" and
other variations on Calder.92 And to be fair, the technological revolution of the
Internet has put even greater pressure on geographically-bounded notions of
state sovereignty than did the inventions of the automobile and plane travel or
the globalization of commerce.
93
In recent years, however, commentators and courts have begun to coalesce
around the idea that the well-established tools of modem personal jurisdiction
analysis-long-arm statutes, minimum contacts analysis, and the indicators of
constitutional reasonableness-are adequate to the task of keeping Internet
jurisdiction within the bounds of the Due Process Clause. 94 This section argues
89 Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2002); ALS Scan, Inc.
v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002).
90 See, e.g., Dailey v. Popma, 662 S.E.2d 12, 14 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that the
Internet presents "unique considerations" for determining personal jurisdiction, requiring it
to adopt tests specifically designed for the Internet).
91 Cf MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREE SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE
63-77 (2d ed. 2003) (opining on the judicial and congressional backlash against the freedom
of the Internet).
9 2 See Spencer, supra note 43, at 76-86 (summarizing the evolution of the various
approaches used in the federal courts and criticizing the various tests).
93 Cf World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 308-09 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the jurisdictional principles of International Shoe
may have become outdated due to rapid changes in commerce and transportation).
94 See, e.g., Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 703 n.7 (7th Cir. 2010) (declining to
adopt a special test for Intemet-based libel and relying on Calder instead); Fraser v. Smith,
594 F.3d 842, 847 (1 1th Cir. 2010) (declining to adopt an Internet-specific jurisdictional
test); Caiazzo v. Am. Royal Arts Corp., 73 So. 3d 245, 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per
curiam) (explicitly refusing to adopt the Zippo test in an Internet-based libel case); Catherine
Ross Dunham, Zippo-ing the Wrong Way: How the Internet Has Misdirected the Federal
Courts in Their Personal Jurisdiction Analysis, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 559, 584 (2009)
(concluding that "[a]ll things new do not require new things"); Allyson W. Haynes, The
Short Arm of the Law: Simplifying Personal Jurisdiction over Virtually Present Defendants,
64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 133, 163-64 (2009) (arguing that states should use long-arm statutes to
limit personal jurisdiction based on Internet contacts); Spencer, supra note 43, at 104-16
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that these analytical tools are also adequate in the context of Internet libel, with
a few adjustments to take account of the difference between libel published on
paper and libel published on the Internet. It also explores whether a highly
restrictive test like the one in Young is desirable to avoid chilling speech on the
Internet-either of media or individual defendants.
A. The Young Test Overlooks the Reach and Impact of Internet
Publications
The Young test relies on the presumption that Internet publications are-by
virtue of their ubiquitous scope-targeted nowhere. It thus treats local and
regional print newspapers as if they were available only to their local and
regional audiences, even when they have a geographically unrestricted Web
presence. But this is nothing more than an attempt to superimpose geographical
boundaries on a medium whose essence transcends such boundaries; by
publishing on the Internet, the paper has deliberately made itself accessible to
the nation, even if it does not aspire to a national audience.
Publishers that use the Internet are not blind to its reach (it is called the
World Wide Web, after all). On the contrary, Internet publishers use the
medium precisely because of its scope and because this is how readers now
expect and demand to get their information. 95 The New Haven Advocate could
limit itself to print publications, but it likely maintains a Web site because the
site enhances the paper's reach and readership for a fraction of the cost of
producing and distributing paper copies.96 The Advocate may not be targeting a
Virginia audience, but the Internet allows it to reach a Virginia audience.
97
Thus, while an Internet publisher might not intend to serve a national market, by
using the Internet, the publisher is knowingly making its writing accessible to
the national market.
But is this choice to use the Internet enough to show that the publisher has
"purposefully directed" its publication at an audience in the forum state? 98 After
(arguing that courts should apply traditional principles to cases involving Internet contacts
until the Supreme Court indicates otherwise); Allan R. Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of
Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 32 INT'L LAW. 1167, 1173 (1998) (arguing that "in spite of all
its space-defying qualities, claims arising on the Internet are susceptible to a fairly coherent
resolution under existing jurisdictional doctrine").
95 Spencer, supra note 43, at 87 (criticizing the presumption of aimlessness).
96 See supra note 53.
9 7 Further, while it is generally true that Internet publication automatically produces
world-wide access, sophisticated media defendants are capable of employing geographic
limitation devices that limit access of their media to particular jurisdictions. Spencer, supra
note 43, at 87 (noting that use of such devices could indicate a desire to reach less than a
nationwide audience).
98 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1.985) (quoting Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774-75 (1984)).
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all, the "foreseeable unilateral" 99-activity of a third party-a Virginia resident
who searches for news about Wallens Ridge on the Internet, or a news
aggregator that pulls the article to the Web browsers of Virginians-must
intervene before the article "reaches" Virginia. I believe that it is, because the
publisher at the outset controls the distribution of its publication by choosing to
place it on the Web. To use an analogy to the "stream of commerce" cases, the
publisher that uses the Internet has decided to market its product through a
national distributor to a national audience.' 00 It can keep itself truly local by
restricting itself to print, or by using geographic limiters to control access to its
Web site or to certain content and features on its Web site. It can also choose
which articles to publish in which medium-print or electronic. In short, the
publisher purposefully avails itself of the Internet as a national medium, and
should not be allowed to claim--or be imputed with-innocence of its potential
audience.
The Internet also creates new and powerful ways to target a libel victim
without circulating papers in his home state or even designing one's Web site
for readers in that forum.1° 1 In Young, for example, it is likely that the articles
published in the Hartford Courant and the New Haven Advocate were of great
interest to a Virginia audience because they decried harsh conditions in a
Virginia prison. In addition to encouraging public debate in Connecticut, the
articles might have had the effect of encouraging the Virginia taxpayers who
read the articles to debate whether they supported such harsh prison conditions
and the (allegedly racist) public official who implemented them. And even
though physical copies of the papers were not circulated to a Virginia audience,
and the defendants' Web sites were not designed to appeal to Virginia readers,
the media defendants could reasonably have anticipated (or even hoped) that the
subject matter of the articles would be of interest to this audience in addition to
its Connecticut readership. By posting the articles on the Internet-and thus
making them readily accessible to anyone in Virginia with a Web browser and
Googlel 02-mentioning a Virginia resident by name, and making harshly
99 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 110 (1987) (plurality
opinion).
10 0 See id. at 112 (noting that additional conduct of the defendant that "may indicate an
intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State" includes "marketing the product
through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State"); see also
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2801 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(arguing that an international manufacturer purposefully avails itself of the market in all the
states served by its national distributor). But see id. at 2790 (plurality opinion) (finding that
the intent to serve a national market does not translate into an intent to serve the market of a
particular state).
101 Lidsky, supra note 78, at 863-64.
102 Residents of Virginia who use news aggregator Web sites may have had the article
"pulled" to them automatically, eliminating the need for individualized searches. See
generally Emma Heald, Google News and Newspaper Publishers: Allies or Enemies?,
EDITORS WEBLOG (Mar. 11, 2009, 3:39 PM), http://www.editorsweblog.org/analysis/2009/
03/google news and newspaper publishers all.php (explaining the basic mechanism of
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critical comments about the state prison run by that resident, the defendants
(especially if they have any experience vetting articles for newspapers) could
reasonably anticipate being haled into court for libel in Virginia.
A Web publisher's deliberate choice to access a national audience casts
doubt on the claim that it is unfair to subject her to jurisdiction in remote states
where the writing is accessible. Instead of presuming that the publisher is
aimless or unintentional in taking advantage of a cheap and effective nationwide
medium, it is more accurate to presume that the publisher is purposefully
making the writing accessible to the entire nation. 103 Using the minimum
contacts analysis, publication by Internet (purposefully availing oneself of the
privilege of making one's writings available within a state) would be one of the
many factors-including the target audience of the publication-that
determines whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with the forum state.
But there seems little reason to avoid or ignore the fact that the Internet, by
making the libel readily accessible there, facilitated the plaintiffs injury in the
forum state.
Further, it seems wrong to assume that the differences between print and
Internet publications require courts to employ different tests for jurisdiction
over libel defendants. Internet publication mimics-albeit in a more powerful
way-the mechanism of print publication. The similarities between the media
are obvious. Both forms of publication permit language (including libel) to be
carried to forums distant from the source of the language (the author or
publisher). Both forms of publication facilitate the long-term storage of
information and are susceptible to "viral" republication-they can be passed
from person to person, copied, excerpted, read aloud, transmitted or carried into
different jurisdictions. The chief difference is similarly obvious: the Internet
accomplishes its job with a speed and scope not possible using print; it allows
every individual with an Internet connection to become, in effect, a broadcaster.
In addition, the potential for viral republication and the long-term caching of a
libel is much greater on the Internet.
Without question, society must make adjustments to its jurisdictional rules
when a new technology dramatically enhances the power of an old technology.
The advent of modem printing technology forced a change in the longstanding
defamation rule that a publisher was liable for each separate publication of libel;
the current law holds that the statute of limitations is tolled by one publication,
thus protecting publishers from the devastating liability of the older rule, in
which each republication provided a separate cause of action. 10 4 Similarly,
when cars made interstate travel-and accidents with drivers from foreign
states-more prevalent, courts had to adjust and update their jurisdictional
rules. But the rules were not updated to protect only the out-of-state motorists.
news aggregators such as Google News, which pull stories from multiple news sources and
can be personalized to reflect the reader's particular interests).
103 Spencer, supra note 43, at 88 (arguing that use of the Internet should create a
rebuttable presumption of contact with the forum state).
104 SACK & BARON, supra note 45, at 363-65.
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The courts considering non-resident motorist statutes weighed the plaintiffs
interest in having a "convenient" mechanism for obtaining relief against the
defendant's interest in not being sued in a foreign jurisdiction and factored in
the interests of other stakeholders in the interstate judicial system. 10 5 Thus far,
the Fourth Circuit has adjusted its personal jurisdiction analysis in only one
direction-to protect Internet publishers from nationwide jurisdiction. Given
that the Internet dramatically enhances the potential for harm to reputation, the
court's analysis should also ask whether the victims of libel have a convenient
and effective forum for relief.
10 6
B. A Thought Experiment to Show How Traditional Jurisdictional
Principles Provide Adequate Safeguards to Protect the Due Process
Rights of Defendants Who Publish on the Internet
To illustrate the ways that traditional personal jurisdiction analysis has
built-in safeguards for Internet publishers, this section first describes the case of
Dailey v. Popma, a North Carolina Court of Appeals opinion in which the court
adopted the Young test and applied it to a libel case involving an individual (not
media) defendant. It then reconsiders Dailey using a more typical jurisdictional
analysis-minimum contacts and constitutional reasonableness-to explore
what that analysis might have looked like and what it might have revealed.
The discussion follows the framework of personal jurisdiction analysis
established in World-Wide Volkswagen and later cases: it first considers
whether the defendant's purposeful contacts with the forum state gave rise to
the lawsuit and are substantial enough for the defendant to have anticipated a
lawsuit in the forum.10 7 Second, it examines whether it is constitutionally
reasonable for the State to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. This latter
analysis requires balancing "the burden on the defendant,. . . the forum State's
interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiffs interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief, . . . the interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest
of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."'
10 8
105 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).
106 Cf World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 309-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the constitutional concept of fairness does not require giving the defendant an
"unjustified veto" over otherwise appropriate fora). Contra Robertson, supra note 46, at 5
(arguing that the plaintiff should be forced to travel to the defendant's jurisdiction to sue in
all but the exceptional case where a plaintiff can prove the defendant's wrongdoing at the
outset of the lawsuit).
107 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294.
1081d. at 292 (citing McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Kulko v.
Cal. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92-93, 98 (1978)).
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As will be shown, all of these factors can be used to mitigate the jurisdictional
exposure of an Internet publisher. 0 9
1. The North Carolina Court of Appeals Adopts the Young Test in Dailey
v. Popma
In Dailey v. Popma, the North Carolina Court of Appeals applied the test in
Young to deny jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in a libel case involving two
individuals. 10 The plaintiff, Dailey, was a North Carolina resident who
operated "shooting 'camps' in North Carolina and Alabama, among other
states.111 The defendant, Popma, was a Georgia resident who posted the
allegedly defamatory comments about Dailey and his camps on an Internet
"bulletin board." 112 Popma had owned a residence in North Carolina until
shortly before Dailey sued him. 113
Had the court applied the simplified, three-step Calder effects test to the
case, it likely would have found the minimum contacts requirement satisfied.
Reading the complaint favorably to the plaintiff, the postings mentioned Dailey
and his shooting camps by name, Popma knew that the plaintiff lived and
operated camps in North Carolina, and at least one other participant in the
Internet discussion board was a North Carolina resident)14 These facts are
likely sufficient to satisfy the effects test, as they establish that Popma could
have foreseen that he might be subject to jurisdiction in North Carolina for
publishing to at least one North Carolina resident allegedly injurious falsehoods
about another North Carolina resident who operates a business in that state.
115
109 Spencer, supra note 43, at 105-07. States can further limit jurisdiction over foreign
publishers using their long-arm statutes. Haynes, supra note 94, at 162-64.
110 Dailey v. Popma, 662 S.E.2d 12, 18 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). The North Carolina courts
had previously adopted the Fourth Circuit's test from ALS Scan for jurisdiction in cases with
electronically mediated contacts. Havey v. Valentine, 616 S.E.2d 642, 647-48 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2005).
11 1 Dailey, 662 S.E.2d at 15. Dailey's shooting camps teach riflery and marksmanship
skills. See generally Mattathias Schwartz, Firing Line, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2010, § 6
(Magazine), at 38 (describing one of Dailey's camps); PROJECT APPLESEED HOME,
http://appleseedinfo.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2012) (describing the organization as
"dedicated to teaching every American our shared heritage and history as well as traditional
rifle marksmanship skills").
112 Affidavit of Donald Popma 5, Dailey, 662 S.E.2d 12 (No. 06 CVS 9903).
"13 Dailey, 662 S.E.2d at 14-15; Affidavit of Donald Popma, supra note 112, 3.
114Dailey, 662 S.E.2d at 15; Complaint 1-9, Dailey, 662 S.E.2d 12 (No. 06 CVS
9903); Affidavit of Donald Popma, supra note 112, 5. Because Dailey failed to submit an
affidavit in support of jurisdiction, or any of the offensive postings in question, the court
credited the defendant's version of the facts. Dailey, 662 S.E.2d at 16. North Carolina does
not follow federal pleading rules. Holleman v. Aiken, 668 S.E.2d 579, 584 (N.C. Ct. App.
2008).
115 Dailey, 662 S.E.2d at 18.
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Instead of applying Calder and analyzing whether it would be reasonable to
assert jurisdiction over Popma, the court of appeals adopted Young and
analyzed whether Popma, through his Internet postings, had the "intent to target
and focus on North Carolina readers."1 6 Despite Popma's implicit admission
that some of the discussants on the bulletin board were from North Carolina,
117
the court found insufficient evidence that he intended "to direct his content to a
North Carolina audience.' ' 1 8 Because the court found that minimum contacts in
the form of audience targeting were lacking, it did not conduct a constitutional
reasonableness analysis, which would have considered factors such as the
burden on Popma of defending in a foreign state, or whether Dailey would have
an effective and convenient remedy for his injury if he was denied a forum in
North Carolina. 19
The opinion in Dailey, like that in Young, manifests a deep unease with
basing personal jurisdiction on Internet-mediated contacts. For example, the
court worried that "[t]he defense of lack of personal jurisdiction would, in
effect, be eliminated from all cases involving defamation on the internet
because: '[T]he Internet is omnipresent-when a person places information on
the Internet, he can communicate with persons in virtually every
jurisdiction."1
20
The opinion in Dailey also drew a sharp distinction between Internet and
print publications, especially in light of cases involving print libel in which
North Carolina has aggressively asserted its long-arm jurisdiction. In Saxon v.
Smith, for example, the defendant, Smith, mailed 100 defamatory newsletters to
North Carolina residents from Virginia. 121 Given that the injury in defamation
occurs "wherever the offending material is circulated," the court in Saxon
concluded that the plaintiffs injury took place in North Carolina. 122 Following
116 1d. (emphasis added).
117 Popma's jurisdictional affidavit averred that he and "some of the participants in the
bulletin board discussion were not located in North Carolina," implicitly admitting that some
of the discussants were from North Carolina. Id.
18 Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
119The court need not weigh the reasonableness factors if it finds insufficient contacts
between the defendant and the forum state. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980). However, the fairness factors are an already-established limit on
the defendant's exposure to nationwide jurisdiction and might mitigate the defendant's
jurisdictional exposure.
120Dailey, 662 S.E.2d at 18 (alteration in original) (quoting ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital
Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002)).
121 Saxon v. Smith, 479 S.E.2d 788, 790 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
1221d. at 792-93. The court in Saxon also relied on Calder to find jurisdiction over
Saxon's other intentional tort claims (intentional infliction of emotional distress and
malicious prosecution):
North Carolina was the situs of the tortious injury alleged in each. Defendants'
distribution of the newsletter in North Carolina and registering of a complaint with law
enforcement authorities [in Virginia] were actions directed at plaintiff within this state.
[Vol. 73:3
2012] INTERNET DEFA MA TION AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION 565
Saxon, the court in Popma could have concluded that Dailey was injured in
North Carolina by Popma's choice to post on the Internet, which "circulated"
the material in North Carolina by making the material accessible there.
Mimicking the Fourth Circuit, however, the court of appeals found that "[a]n
[I]nternet posting, such as the ones in this case-which is not 'sent' anywhere
in particular, but rather can be accessed from anywhere in the world-is a
contact of a qualitatively different 'nature' than a physical mailing."'123 Thus,
"the fact that some unspecified number of participants in the discussion groups
might be North Carolinians" did not establish targeting or focus on a North
Carolina audience. 124 The presumption of aimlessness worked in favor of
Popma.
2. What Might a More Traditional Jurisdictional Analysis Have
Revealed?
As previously demonstrated, even a simplistic consideration of the factors
relevant in Calder would likely have resulted in a finding of minimum contacts
in Dailey v. Popma: the defendant made allegedly defamatory statements about
a North Carolina resident, whom he knew to run a North Carolina business, and
the defendant was aware that at least one of the other participants in the bulletin
board was a North Carolina resident.
This conclusion in favor of jurisdiction is also supported by a more careful
consideration of other relevant contacts, including the type of Internet forum
where Popma posted his commentary. Bulletin boards (also called Internet
forums) are sometimes focused on geographical topics; had Popma posted his
comments on, for example, the North Carolina Gun Owners forum, 125 he clearly
would have targeted a North Carolina audience. More often, however, a bulletin
board is designed to appeal to people with similar interests or hobbies,
regardless of their location. 126 Thus, for example, gun enthusiasts might
participate in a forum generally dedicated to people with such interests, 127 or in
a more specialized forum for people interested in a particular type of gun. 128 By
posting to this kind of generalized bulletin board, Popma was not targeting a
North Carolina audience, but he was clearly targeting an audience of people to
whom Dailey's reputation mattered. Further, if the Internet indeed generated
The alleged resultant harm occurred in North Carolina, the residence of plaintiff, not
Virginia, the location of defendants.
Id. at 793-94.
123 Dailey, 662 S.E.2d at 19.
1241d. at 18.
125See, e.g., N.C. GuN OWNERS, http://www.ncgunowners.com/ (last visited Apr. 14,
2012).
126 Lidsky, supra note 78, at 897.
12 7 See, e.g., HIGH ROAD, http://www.thehighroad.org/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
128See, e.g., 1911 FORUM, http://1911forum.com/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2012); GLOCK
TALK, http://www.glocktalk.com/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
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significant business opportunities for Dailey, Popma's choice of forum would
have caused the brunt of any reputational injury to be felt in North Carolina,
where Dailey lives. Without the Young presumption of aimlessness in place,
Popma's admitted knowledge of the location of Dailey's home and business
made it foreseeable that his comment would injure Dailey in North Carolina. By
deliberately posting these comments on an Internet bulletin board, Popma must
have known that his comments would be available to other gun enthusiasts in
North Carolina or to other people who might potentially do business with
Dailey in North Carolina. Thus, he could have foreseen that he might be haled
into court in North Carolina, even if he was not deliberately seeking a North
Carolina audience for his comments. But this is merely the first step in the
minimum contacts analysis.
The next step is to determine whether the cause of action is "related" to the
forum state, as required for a finding of specific jurisdiction, 129 which will
almost certainly be the basis of jurisdiction in the case of an individual non-
resident libel defendant. A close nexus between the contact, the cause of action,
and the forum state bolsters the foreseeability of the defendant's conduct
resulting in a lawsuit in the forum state. In Dailey v. Popma, relatedness would
have been established by the specific mention of Dailey and his shooting camps,
as well as their location in the forum state. It is not clear from the facts of the
case, however, that the content of the libel specifically mentioned North
Carolina. If there was no mention of North Carolina, or there was no evidence
that Popma knew where Dailey lived and worked, or perhaps if Popma had only
made disparaging comments about Dailey's Alabama shooting camps, then
Popma would be able to argue that he could not have foreseen being haled into
court in North Carolina and that the libel was not targeted at the plaintiff in his
home state.
An additional consideration in the minimum contacts analysis is to
determine whether the defendant's own purposeful behavior brought him into
contact with the forum state, or whether the contact was created through the
unilateral or fortuitous behavior of third parties. 130 In most libel cases, that
requirement is satisfied by the intentional (not accidental) nature of actions
underlying the tort of defamation. 131 There is nothing accidental about
publishing comments on an Internet bulletin board or utilizing a medium that
the publisher knows will be accessible in the plaintiffs home state. The
volitional behavior of the defendant is thus the basis of the alleged harm and of
personal jurisdiction. But if, for example, Popma had written the comment in an
e-mail to a third party not located in North Carolina, and the third party had
then forwarded the e-mail or quoted its contents on a bulletin board, Popma
129 See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (noting that the contacts
related to the cause of action must create a "substantial connection" with the forum state).
130 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
131 Murphy v. Erwin-Wasey, Inc., 460 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir. 1972) (noting that
intentional torts like libel and fraud generally satisfy the constitutional requirement of
"purposeful[] avail[ment]").
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would have a good argument that he had not purposefully used the Internet to
make the comments accessible in North Carolina.
Although the factual record in Dailey v. Popma was not well developed, it
seems likely that adequate facts existed to support a finding of contacts under
the expanded Calder approach. That conclusion does not end the analysis. Even
assuming that Popma met the minimum contacts threshold, a court would still
have to determine whether the assertion of jurisdiction is constitutionally
reasonable. Two aspects of the reasonableness analysis are particularly relevant
to concerns that the Internet exposes a libel defendant to nationwide personal
jurisdiction: the plaintiffs interest in convenient and effective relief, and the
forum state's interest in adjudicating the suit. A plaintiff who sues in his home
state can make a strong argument that he has chosen a convenient forum.
Further, the home state has a strong interest in vindicating the interests of its
citizens. Because Dailey sued Popma in North Carolina, Dailey could make a
strong argument that jurisdiction in North Carolina, Dailey's home state, was
reasonable: it is convenient to Dailey, and North Carolina has a strong interest
in protecting the reputations of its citizens. Nevertheless, Popma would still be
able to argue that travelling to North Carolina from Georgia to defend the suit
would be unduly burdensome.
But what if Dailey had sued Popma in Alabama, where he also ran shooting
camps? Jurisdiction in Alabama might have been foreseeable to Popma (if he
knew that Dailey ran shooting camps there), but Dailey would be harder pressed
to argue that it was a convenient forum for him (unless, perhaps, he spent a
significant amount of time in the state), and Alabama has less of an interest in
protecting the reputational interests of non-citizens. Finally, if Dailey had sued
Popma in Alaska (where the article was also accessible), he would struggle to
make a bona fide argument that the forum was convenient for him or that
Alaska had a strong interest in protecting the reputational rights of someone
with no contact with the state (not to mention that the injury was not related to
the forum state or foreseeable based on the content of the libel).
The Supreme Court has held, however, that a libel plaintiff can assert injury
even in states where she has a small reputation or is anonymous, and that states
may construct their legal regimes to take an interest in protecting the reputations
of non-residents. 132 The breadth of this ruling, which seemingly threatens
Internet publishers with nationwide jurisdiction, is mitigated by the limited
circumstances that give rise to unbounded libel tourism. In particular, there
must be evidence that the forum state has taken a particular interest in
protecting their populace from false statements of fact made about non-
residents. In Keeton, for example, New Hampshire had drafted its criminal
132 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776-77 (1984) (noting that New
Hampshire may "extend its concern to the injury that in-state libel causes within New
Hampshire to a nonresident," and that a plaintiff "may suffer harm even in a state in which
he has hitherto been anonymous"); see N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 644:11 (2007) (misdemeanor
to make defamatory statements about "any other living person"); id. § 300:14 (1977) (noting
deletion of residency requirement).
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defamation statute without a requirement that the victim be a resident and
deleted from its long-arm statute the requirement that the plaintiff be a New
Hampshire resident. 133 Not every state has exhibited such a desire to vigorously
protect its populace from injurious falsehoods or to safeguard the reputations of
non-residents. 34 States concerned that their courts might overreach in cases of
Internet libel can amend the relevant legislation to clarify exactly whom they
want to hale into court on charges of libel.
But what about states that might want to become havens for libel tourism
(say, for example, New Hampshire, with its long statute of limitations for libel
and its expansive long-arm statute)? Even in these extreme circumstances, there
are additional constitutional fairness considerations that libel defendants can
argue to avoid jurisdiction135: the need for the interstate judicial system to
resolve disputes efficiently and the "shared interest of the several States in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.' 136 It will be difficult for the
plaintiff to argue that a state with which neither she nor the defendant has any
connection is an efficient forum for the case; the travel expenses for parties and
witnesses counsel strongly against it. Finally, the defendant can argue that it
contradicts public policy for any one state to aggressively police Internet libel
that does not injure its residents because it undermines state sovereignty and the
limits on personal jurisdiction inherent in the Due Process Clause. 137
This seems like a logical place to find the limits of personal jurisdiction in
cases of Internet libel-by pressing on the bona fides of the plaintiff's choice of
forum, on the burden to the defendant of having to defend in a remote forum, on
the efficiency of the chosen forum, and the substantive concerns associated with
permitting such jurisdiction. True, it is a messy and unpredictable approach, but
a messy test is preferable to one that relies on fictional presumptions about the
Internet. Courts can limit personal jurisdiction by being skeptical of a plaintiff's
choice to travel far from home to file her lawsuit. But, before denying
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, courts should also consider carefully
133 Keeton, 465 U.S. at 777.
134 Currently, only thirteen states have criminal libel statutes: Colorado, COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-13-105 (2011); Florida, FLA. STAT. §§ 836.01-.11 (2011); Idaho, IDAHO CODE
ANN. §§ 18-4801 to -4809 (2004); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:47 (2007);
Michigan, MICH. COmP. LAWS ANN. § 750.370 (West 2004); Minnesota, MINN. STAT.
§ 609.765 (2010); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:11 (2007); New Mexico,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-11-1 (2004); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-47 (2011); North
Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-01 (1997); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§§ 771-781 (West 2002); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-417 (2009); and Wisconsin, Wis.
STAT. § 942.01 (Supp. 2011).
135 And if all jurisdictional arguments fail, the defendant can also move for a transfer
based on convenience or dismissal for forum non conveniens.
136 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
137 The majority opinion in Keeton did not address the defendant's state sovereignty and
federalism arguments. See Brief for Respondents at 29-36, Keeton, 465 U.S. 770 (No. 82-
485). Justice Brennan briefly dismissed these concerns in his concurring opinion. Keeton,
465 U.S. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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whether the lawsuit will be pursued at all if the plaintiff is denied a forum in her
home state.
C. First Amendment Concerns
Given that libel actions are bound up with First Amendment concerns, it is
important to examine whether free speech values are threatened by a more
robust rule of personal jurisdiction in libel cases. Personal jurisdiction and
constitutional libel doctrines serve fundamentally different goals. The goals of
personal jurisdiction are to honor state sovereignty and, as a matter of fairness,
avoid subjecting defendants to jurisdiction in remote and unforeseeable forums.
Jurisdictional doctrine is also concerned with helping potential defendants
rationally manage the risk of litigation associated with their "primary
conduct."' 138 In contrast, 'the substantive limitations on libel imposed by New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan prevent libel suits from inhibiting speech on public
matters; the libel limitations ensure that dialogue on such matters can be
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," even if it becomes "vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp," or occasionally includes erroneous
information. 139 First Amendment doctrine also protects against the "chill" of
self-censorship associated with vague or overbroad speech regulations, such as
overzealously enforced libel laws.
But the Supreme Court has consistently rejected the suggestion that libel
plaintiffs should have to leap extra jurisdictional hurdles to avoid chilling
speech. In Calder, the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that any potential
chill on free speech stemming from uncertainty about jurisdiction-including
exposure to nationwide jurisdiction-is adequately addressed by the
"constitutional limitations on the substantive law governing [libel].' 140
Furthermore, "[t]o reintroduce those concerns at the jurisdictional stage would
be a form of double counting," and "needlessly complicate an already imprecise
inquiry."' 1
41
Yet free speech advocates (like myself) cannot easily dismiss lingering
concerns for the speech rights of Internet publishers. The notorious imprecision
of the personal jurisdiction inquiry introduces significant uncertainty into the
publisher's risk calculus. Under the minimum contacts analysis outlined in the
previous section, a publisher's knowing use of the Web potentially means
minimum contacts with fifty states, and the limits inherent in the jurisdictional
fairness inquiry may not seem like adequate protection from such exposure.
142
138 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
139376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
140 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984); see also Lidsky, supra note 78, at 872-75
(noting the many obstacles for libel plaintiffs posed by the substantive demands of tort law,
First Amendment doctrine, and other constitutional privileges).
141 Calder, 465 U.S. at 790; Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780 n.12.
142 Spencer, supra note 43, at 113-14.
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Such uncertainty might chill the otherwise robust culture of expression on the
Internet. 1
43
National media outlets have, of course, been coping with this jurisdictional
regime for thirty years. But smaller news outlets may hesitate before publishing
on the Web, or may be more inclined to use geographic limiters on their
content, thereby "balkanizing" the Web. 144 Finally, the risk will be greatest for
individual publishers on the Internet, such as bloggers or participants in bulletin
boards and chat rooms. If such individuals publish a libel concerning private
figures on matters of private concern, these individuals may be subject to
jurisdiction in states with widely varying standards for libel, including, perhaps,
a strict liability standard. 145 Furthermore, individual defendants typically are not
well insured against the cost of defending a libel lawsuit-not to mention one
filed in a remote forum-and thus the threat of a libel action may "overdeter"
Internet speech from individuals. 146 This section briefly addresses these issues
in turn: first, the concerns of smaller media outlets, and second, the concerns of
individual publishers.
1. Better Vetting
The cost imposed on local or regional media outlets by increased
jurisdictional exposure likely can be addressed through pre-publication review
processes-vetting-before articles are published to the Web. The process of
vetting involves identifying potentially libelous statements in an article and
assessing the risk of a lawsuit. 147 Assuming that all responsible media sources
vet their articles, vetting for fifty-state liability is not significantly more costly
than vetting only for local liability. Once a newspaper identifies potentially
libelous comments in the article, it can rationally anticipate litigation exposure
in the home jurisdiction of the person named in the article, especially if the
143 But see Lidsky, supra note 78, at 885-87 (arguing that defamation law could have
the beneficial effect of making Internet discourse more civil, rational, and coherent).
144 Spencer, supra note 43, at 115.
145 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985)
(holding that "recovery of presumed and punitive damages in defamation cases absent a
showing of 'actual malice' does not violate the First Amendment when the defamatory
statements do not involve matters of public concern"); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 347 (1974) (holding that "so long as [states] do not impose liability without fault," they
"may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual"); SACK & BARON,
supra note 45, at 352-55; Lidsky, supra note 78, at 913.
146 See Lidsky, supra note 78, at 888-91 (discussing the chilling effect of defamation
lawsuits on individual defendants).
14 7 See generally THE ASSOCIATED PRESS STYLEBOOK AND BRIEFING ON MEDIA LAW
367-68 (Norm Goldstein ed., 42d ed. 2007) [hereinafter ASSOCIATED PRESS STYLEBOOK]
(providing a checklist for editors to review, including buzzwords and red flags).
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jurisdiction is named in the article. 148 In the case of the New Haven Advocate,
for example, the offending article clearly identified Virginia and the name and
occupation of the plaintiff, Young. The publisher would then need to factor in
the potential cost of defending a lawsuit in a remote location. Geography
becomes one additional risk factor in the vetting process, not a matter of
requiring additional personnel to engage in the risk assessment or engaging in
complex additional vetting processes.
149
Such vetting does not invariably result in censoring the risky statement;
often it merely forces the reporter to check the facts more carefully (truth being
a defense to libel). 150 The media outlet would also have the option of publishing
that article only in its print version or using a geographical restrictor if it
publishes the article on its Web site. Such limits on publication would be factors
showing an intent not to direct the libel at the plaintiff in her home state and
would work in the defendant's favor if the plaintiff were to sue in that forum.151
Finally, media outlets typically publish articles on matters of public
concern. In this regard, they have the advantage that the applicable substantive
libel laws are essentially the same in all fifty states, regardless of the potential
plaintiffs location, because of First Amendment limits on libel actions brought
against media defendants on matters of public concern.
2. Reform of Substantive Law
Frankly, there is little to say to reassure the individual Internet publisher
about potentially expanding his jurisdictional exposure. A restrictive
jurisdictional test, like the one in Young, better protects that publisher against
jurisdictional exposure than a messy balancing test that relies on multiple
amorphous factors (and an advocate with the skill and savvy to argue them
well). Nevertheless, courts should not construct fictions about the Internet out of
fear of the medium or even an understandable (if misguided) desire to protect
the speech of the individual publisher. As the Supreme Court has made clear,
148 As a practical matter, most libel cases involve individual plaintiffs, who are likely
present in only a few jurisdictions, not in every state where the Internet can be accessed.
Thus, a defendant who publishes a libel-even one who publishes in fifty states-is
realistically at risk of being haled into court for defamation in one or two jurisdictions, not
all fifty, and the substance of the libel will most likely reveal the jurisdictions of highest risk.
The example of libel tourism approved in Keeton is the exception, not the rule. Tamburo v.
Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 707 n.10 (7th Cir. 2010).
149The Associated Press Stylebook does not currently list "geography" on its editor's
checklist. See ASSOCIATED PRESS STYLEBOOK, supra note 147, at 367-68.
150 See, e.g., SARAH HARRISON SMITH, THE FACT CHECKER'S BIBLE 112-14 (2004)
(noting the wisdom of scrupulously fact-checking any "sensitive" or potentially libelous
material as the process itself helps to avoid liability).
151 Cf Spencer, supra note 43, at 115 (arguing that use of the Internet should give rise to
a presumption of purposeful availment of the benefits of the state in which the injurious
material was accessed; use of geographic-limiting technology would help the defendant
rebut that presumption).
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the concerns of the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment should remain
separate. What, then, can be done to protect the individual publisher?
While it might seem like an unsatisfactory answer, the optimal protection
comes from reform of the substantive law of libel. The Supreme Court has
never clarified whether the constitutional protections of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. apply to non-media defendants. State
courts are split on this matter, and thus it is still possible (if unlikely) that a non-
media publisher being sued by a private plaintiff might be subject to strict
liability for libel in some jurisdictions.1
52
In the blogger's nightmare scenario, the blogger publishes a defamatory
statement about a well-capitalized individual or corporation; the target of the
libel then sues the blogger in a remote forum, using the prohibitive costs of
litigation as a very real threat to silence the blogger's speech. 15 3 But the well-
capitalized plaintiff with a vendetta---or a valid complaint-is unlikely to be
deterred from pursuing an out-of-state defendant by a mere jurisdictional ruling;
that plaintiff can simply re-file his claim against the blogger in his home state.
The cost of litigating may be somewhat lessened for the defendant, but the
threat of a judgment will be just as real. Only the substantive reform of libel law
can reduce this threat.
Obviously, it is preferable for legislatively-mandated libel reform to take
place before an individual publisher becomes the target of a highly motivated
and well-capitalized plaintiff. State courts can also reform libel rules that
inadequately protect the speech rights of the defendants who appear before
them-for example, by using the opinion privilege to shield speech on matters
of public concern. 154 But substantive libel reform will ultimately better protect
individual publishers from liability than jurisdictional safeguards ever could.
IV. THE Fix: RETURN TO MINIMUM CONTACTS
The Internet has empowered uncivil discourse. No longer is it expensive or
difficult for me to broadcast an injurious falsehood; I can simply blog, post on
Facebook, send a mass e-mail, post a YouTube video, or join a chat room and
find a potentially global audience for my libel. But there is no reason why the
greater potential for harming reputations via the Internet should create a
jurisdictional safe harbor for the tortfeasor. The tortfeasor's very resort to a
152 SACK & BARON, supra note 45, at 352-55; Lidsky, supra note 78, at 904-19
(discussing the uncertainties of First Amendment doctrine as applied to individual
defendants).
153 Cf GODWIN, supra note 91, at 79-108 (describing a lawsuit filed by "the king"
against blogger Brock Meeks); Lidsky, supra note 78, at 891-92 (describing how the
American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Frontier Foundation came to the rescue of
individuals sued for defamation by U-Haul).
154 Lidsky, supra note 78, at 932-44 (describing how the opinion privilege can be
adapted to cyberspace and urging state courts not to wait for the Supreme Court to begin
protecting individual publishers).
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broad and powerful medium such as the Internet should not thereby insulate it
from the broad and powerful jurisdictional rule that would apply if she had
chosen a less powerful medium for her libel.155 The Internet is a robust forum
for speech and ought to remain such. Nevertheless, the reasons for enforcing
civility rules in real space apply equally to cyberspace: defamation is damaging
whether delivered via Internet, print, or broadcast.
The Young audience-targeting test has been influential in libel cases decided
in jurisdictions far from the Fourth Circuit and North Carolina. Several courts
have cited Young with approval and adopted the audience-targeting analysis,]
56
or used the presumption of aimlessness to conclude that a Web site was targeted
at a world-wide audience and therefore not at the forum state.157 A few courts
have declined to adopt the test, questioning whether it is consistent with Calder,
or criticizing the presumption of aimlessness.' 58 None of these courts have
seriously questioned the effect of the test on the plaintiffs access to convenient
and effective relief. 1
59
155 Spencer, supra note 43, at 102.
156 Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1241-46 (10th Cir. 2011) (adopting and
applying the audience-targeting test from Young); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 473 (5th
Cir. 2002) (citing Young with approval); MLS Nat'l Med. Evaluation Servs., Inc. v.
Templin, No. 10-14649, 2011 WL 1869918, at *6-8 (E.D. Mich. May 16, 2011) (applying
the audience-targeting test from Young); Vision Media TV Group, LLC v. Forte, 724 F.
Supp. 2d 1260, 1266 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (same); Gorman v. Jacobs, 597 F. Supp. 2d 541, 548-
49 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (same); Lange v. Thompson, No. C08-0271MJP, 2008 WL 3200249, at
*3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 6, 2008) (same); Shirlington Limousine & Transp., Inc. v. San Diego
Union-Tribune, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 2008) (adopting and applying the audience-
targeting test from Young); Sunlight Saunas, Inc. v. Sundance Sauna, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d
1011, 1021 (D. Kan. 2006) (applying the audience-targeting test from Young); Gentle Wind
Project v. Garvey, No. 04-103-P-C, 2005 WL 40064, at *8-10 (D. Me. Jan. 10, 2005)
(same); Realuyo v. Villa Abrille, No. 01 Civ. 10158(JGK), 2003 WL 21537754, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. July 08, 2003) (same); Rios v. Fergusan, 978 A.2d 592, 598-99 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2008) (adopting an audience-targeting test).
157 Revell, 317 F.3d at 475-76 (noting that "the post to the bulletin board here was
presumably directed at the entire world"); Sunlight Saunas, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1021 (noting
that the Web site was not directed to an audience in Kansas anymore than it was to "users
worldwide"); Lindgren v. GDT, LLC, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1131 (S.D. Iowa 2004)
(reasoning that because defendant's Web site "could be accessed anywhere, including Iowa,
its existence does not demonstrate an intent to purposefully target Iowa").
158 Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1215 (Fla. 2010) (rejecting the
presumption of aimlessness in the context of the Florida long-arm statute); Baldwin v.
Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 397 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (rejecting the premise of Young,
that defendant must target the state, as inconsistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)).
159 The Connecticut courts have adopted an audience-targeting test, but in one case
simply avoided the harsh outcome to the plaintiff that a strict application of the rule would
have required. Rios, 978 A.2d at 598-600 (citing to an audience-targeting test but then
finding jurisdiction over the defendant based on a video he posted on YouTube that targeted
the plaintiff, a Connecticut resident, without finding that the video or the Web site targeted a
Connecticut audience).
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This Article has argued that the audience-targeting approach is yet another
unsuccessful innovation in the judiciary's struggle with the jurisdictional
implications of the Internet. The targeting test too narrowly restricts Calder and
rests on an unjustified fear that the Internet will eviscerate the notion of
sovereign boundaries implicit in the Due Process Clause. This Article therefore
concludes by urging courts to abandon their innovations and return to the
established framework of analysis for personal jurisdiction, messy and
unpredictable though it may be. Courts that are not required to follow Young
should not, and the courts that have adopted it should reconsider. Instead, they
should apply traditional jurisdictional analysis (and stop reducing Calder to a
three-part test), sensitive to the facts and circumstances of the defendant's
behavior, to determine whether the defendant's contacts with the forum state are
sufficient. Courts should also give serious consideration to the equities of
finding jurisdiction, paying particular attention to the forum state's interest in
adjudicating the suit, the plaintiffs interest in convenient and effective relief,
and of course, the burden on the defendant of litigating in a remote forum.
Finally, because there are genuine First Amendment concerns implicated in
a less restrictive jurisdictional test, a change in jurisdictional regimes should be
accompanied by substantive reform of the libel laws to better protect the speech
rights of individual Internet publishers. State legislatures can also clarify their
stance on jurisdiction over libel claims by amending their long-arm statutes to
reflect the level at which they desire to protect their citizens from defamation on
the Internet.1
60
160 See Haynes, supra note 94, at 162-64.
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